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Abstract
This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of pre-
scription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug
procurement that achieves very close to full static eciency { all members have access
to all but at most a single drug { without distorting incentives for innovation.
Prescription drugs are an essential component of modern healthcare. In the U.S. drug
spending has skyrocketed in recent years { while in 1980 it amounted to $12 billion, less than
5% of total health care expenditures, in 2006 that number has increased to $216.7 billion,
over 12% of total expenditures. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
currently projects drug spending to rise to $446.2 billion in 2015, approximately 2.2% of
projected U.S. GDP.1 Those statistics suggest that even minor eciency improvements in
the drug procurement process can lead to signicant welfare gains.
Lessons learned from markets for typical healthcare services such as doctor consultations
and hospital stays are largely not applicable to markets for prescription drugs. In contrast
We would like to thank Jeremy Bulow, Robin Lee, Preston McAfee, Michael Ostrovsky, Andy Skrzypacz,
Joel Sobel and seminar participants at Chicago GSB, Columbia Department of Economics, NBER Summer
Institute and Stanford GSB for helpful comments.
yUC Berkeley and Stanford University, contact: kyna.fong at stanford.edu. Part of this research was
conducted during an internship at Yahoo! Research.
zYahoo! Research and NBER, contact: mschwarz at yahoo-inc.com
1Source: CMS Data and CBO Projections.
1to healthcare services, prescription drugs are often supplied by patent-protected monopolists
and feature marginal costs that are a very small fraction of price. In this respect, prescription
drugs bear a stronger resemblance to information goods such as music and software than to
doctor visits and hospital stays.
This paper oers a conceptual framework for ecient design of government-funded pre-
scription drug procurement. We emphasize that this paper is intended primarily as a thought
exercise rather than a specic policy proposal. We address a basic question { whether ef-
ciency is attainable in the market for prescription drugs in the presence of monopolists {
and then use a highly stylized model to establish a benchmark answer in the armative.
Our main objective is to use economic theory to develop a framework for thinking about
prescription drugs.
For drugs that are zero marginal cost, the socially ecient (static) outcome is for all
individuals who derive a positive expected marginal benet from a drug to have access
to that drug: in other words, static eciency entails universal access.2 Due to patent
protection, however, drugs are often sold by monopolists, and in the benchmark monopoly
pricing case, the prot-maximizing price leads to deadweight loss. One contribution of this
paper is to describe a novel market-based mechanism for government drug procurement
that approaches static eciency without introducing additional distortions to incentives for
innovation (relative to the benchmark monopoly pricing case).
One might argue that appropriately chosen government price controls can accomplish
the same goal. The government achieves static eciency by providing all drugs for free
to its citizens. In conjunction, the government can choose appropriate prices such that
incentives for innovation are unchanged, thus leading to a Pareto gain in welfare. However,
such an arrangement features two major drawbacks: (1) it lacks the power of the market to
dynamically correct for inaccurate pricing, imposing strong informational requirements on
2We assume away externalities. In some cases, drug consumption imposes positive or negative external-
ities. For example, the use of vaccines may prevent an epidemic while the use of antibiotics may create
drug-resistant strains of bacteria.
2the government, and (2) it creates perverse incentives for drug manufacturers to manipulate
prices via lobbying.
In the U.S. lawmakers consider the drawbacks of centralized price interventions serious
enough to exceed their benets. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which has es-
tablished a universal drug benet for the elderly in the form of Medicare Part D, explicitly
prohibits the government from negotiating drug prices. Michael Leavitt, the U.S. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, has written that, \government should not be in the business
of setting drug prices or controlling access to drugs. That is a rst step toward the type of
government-run health care that the American people have always rejected." He describes
government price-setting as a situation in which \one government ocial would set more than
4,400 prices for dierent drugs, making decisions that would be better made by millions of
individual consumers."3 At least in the U.S., a market-driven procurement mechanism that
avoids price controls might be a politically palatable way to improve eciency.
In fact, the U.S. has a long history of using market forces to accompany government
subsidization of prescription drug purchases. In the case of Medicaid, which provides health
insurance for low-income Americans, in 1990 the federal government instituted a \best-price
rule" that ties prices paid by Medicaid to prices paid by private payers. Another example of
policy tying U.S. government subsidies in healthcare to market forces is the advantageous tax
treatment of employer-provided health insurance. Although in both instances the intention
of the government subsidies was to increase access to prescription drugs, studies show that
those interventions have instead led to the perverse eect of raising prescription drug prices
and in fact reducing access to drug coverage. Morton (1997) is the rst to point out that
the Medicaid best-price rule has put upward pressure on drug prices, and Duggan & Morton
(2006) oers conclusive evidence of that. Using entirely dierent methods and data, Schwarz
(2006) nds that the above policies not only have increased drug prices but, by increasing
drug prices, have likely reduced the number of people with access to drugs, perversely the
3Source: Opinion editorial, Washington Post, January 11, 2007.
3opposite eect of what policymakers intended.
In the presence of monopoly-supplied drugs, the main diculty in designing a market-
driven mechanism is that, as long as a monopolist faces a population of consumers with
heterogeneous values, he is likely to set his monopoly price above the reservation price of
some consumers, leading to potentially large deadweight losses. Even when the purchase
of drugs is subsidized in the form of traditional insurance, the same problem persists when
monopolists control prices (Newhouse 2004). Intuitively, if the government subsidizes 50%
of each drug purchase, monopolists will double prices in response and deadweight losses will
remain unchanged.
In this paper, we show that there exists a government-funded, market-driven drug pro-
curement mechanism that gives all consumers access to all but at most a single drug, with-
out introducing additional distortions to innovation. Despite monopoly pricing power, static
near-eciency can be achieved.4;5
In our model we assume that drugs have no substitutes and that each drug is sold by
a monopolist. Although in practice drugs may have therapeutic substitutes, the setting in
which all drugs are supplied by monopolists generates the largest concerns about eciency
and hence is an important benchmark to consider.
Let us describe the intuition behind the market-driven drug procurement mechanism con-
sidered herein. Recall that deadweight losses arise because the demand curve is downward-
sloping, i.e. dierent consumers have dierent willingness to pay. If in fact all consumers
were identical, then a monopolist would set price equal to the universal willingness to pay
and serve the whole market. The key idea we leverage is to \homogenize" demand.
To illustrate that idea, consider a world in which all individuals have the same probability
of disease. The essential source of demand heterogeneity then arises from dierent tastes
4The additional deadweight loss from taxation is zero so long as the funding for the mechanism equals
the amount the government spends on subsidizing drug coverage under the status quo.
5The idea that mechanisms excluding one ecient trade can achieve near eciency has been proposed
in a very dierent setting by McAfee (1992). Specically, in McAfee (1992) one of many identical items is
excluded, whereas in our setting one of many drugs (which are not substitutes) is excluded from coverage.
4and wealth. For true monopoly drugs, which have no substitutes, we argue that demand
heterogeneity takes a specic form: although dierent consumers may have dierent willing-
ness to pay for a given drug, the ratio between willingness to pay for any two monopoly drugs
is constant across all consumers.6
This assumption about the special structure of the demand for drugs is theoretically
grounded. In particular, the assumption is motivated by the literature on the value of life,
which oers a theoretical and empirical framework for thinking about investments in safety
(see Viscusi (1993) for a survey). The main idea is that if a re detector and an air bag are
equally likely to save a life, then any consumer should place equal reservation prices on both
devices. In our context, we argue that drugs or insurance for drug coverage can be viewed
as particular cases of safety devices that \produce" life or, more accurately, health. Hence,
heterogeneity in demand for drugs arises simply from heterogeneity in willingness to pay
for health. This special demand structure is exactly what allows us to construct a market
mechanism that \homogenizes" demand.
The structure of the mechanism at a high level conveniently resembles that of Medicare
Part D in the U.S., which is also government-funded and market-driven with private prescrip-
tion drug plans (PDP's) serving as intermediaries between consumers and drug companies.
The government rst xes a per-member budget (subsidy) B to give to each PDP. Drug
companies announce prices at which the companies are willing to sell their drugs to PDP's.
Drug plans then procure drugs from drug companies and assemble formularies, i.e. the set
of drugs that a given PDP will cover, within the budget constraint B. Consumers choose a
PDP in which to enroll based on formulary comprehensiveness. The drugs that are not on
a formulary continue to be available on the open market at market prices.
Fixing the subsidy serves to homogenize demand: each person now has the same budget
to be spent on her behalf, and thus the willingness to pay for access to a given drug becomes
6Specically, we mean the ratio is constant across all consumers with the same probability of disease (i.e.
either all healthy consumers, or all consumers who have already developed the disease).
5uniform across all people.7 Thus, the subsidy forces drug companies to \compete" with one
another to get on PDP's formularies; as a result, a monopolist can only charge as much as the
relative social value of his product warrants, thus making near ecient outcomes possible.
This mechanism imposes much lower informational requirements on the government than
administering price controls. In order to specify an optimal per-person budget B, the gov-
ernment needs only information about aggregate prots of all drug companies. Furthermore,
in Section 2.1 we argue that the ramications on drug access of choosing a budget size that
is too high or too low are relatively small. In addition, the mechanism generates a natural
feedback loop. If in a given year many drugs are left o formularies, then the government
knows to increase the budget size in the next year; on the other hand, if all drugs are
covered, then the government may consider lowering the budget size. The mechanism also
allows budget size to be used as a convenient tool for calibrating incentives for innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry.
Kremer has described a patent buyout mechanism that achieves near eciency in the
presence of monopolists (Kremer 1998). Buying out patents hinges on the notion of a
two-part tari.8 By transferring lump sums of the appropriate size to inventors (would-be
monopolists) in exchange for patents, the government attains static eciency because the
invention can then be made available at marginal cost.
The major diculty with implementing such a system lies in determining the size of
the lump sum. Kremer's mechanism extracts the relevant information from a market of
private parties, giving them weak incentives to reveal this information truthfully at the cost
of introducing a small ineciency. He points out that the main problem with his mechanism
is that it is susceptible to manipulation. The expected joint payo to a patent holder and
any third party whom he controls can be arbitrarily large, making collusion very attractive.
7This is a consequence of consumers having the same relative valuations for all drugs. Given the same
budget and the same probabilities of disease, consumers will allocate their budget across drugs (or insurance
for drugs) in the same way.
8Lakdawalla and Sood (2006) also focus on two-part taris; in particular, they describe how the two-part
design of health insurance contracts combats the ineciency that results from healthcare providers having
market power.
6In the context of prescription drugs, manipulation is a serious concern since there are only
relatively few pharmaceutical companies and they would be regular repeated participants in
patent buyout auctions. The mechanism we describe cannot be manipulated in this fashion.
While Kremer's (1998) patent buyout mechanism relies on the notion of a two-part tari,
the mechanism we describe does not { in fact, it can be implemented using either linear
pricing or two-part pricing. Instead, the mechanism relies on a fundamentally dierent
idea, homogenizing demand, which can be leveraged in drug procurement due to the unique
demand structure for drugs.
There are several features of the prescription drug market that our model ignores com-
pletely. We assume that consumers are rational and capable of identifying the highest-value
formulary, and we restrict attention to the scenario of pure monopoly drugs, which have no
substitutes. We also assume that consumers either have identical probabilities of contracting
each disease, or that a mechanism for perfect risk adjustment is available. Furthermore, we
assume that the marginal costs of producing drugs and the costs of dispensing drugs are
negligible, thus assuming away the importance of existing pharmacy networks. Nonetheless,
our highly stylized model may oer a useful framework for thinking about drug procurement.
1 Model
1.1 The Environment
There is a nite number N of diseases n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng. Each disease is treated by a unique
drug, and a treatment requires exactly one unit of a drug (drugs have no substitutes). Each
drug is sold by a patent-protected monopolist.9 Drugs are produced at zero marginal cost,
and drug companies maximize expected prots.
For each disease n, let n 2 (0;1] be the probability that an individual contracts the
9If each drug company owns several drugs, we can rephrase our analysis in terms of each company's
portfolio of drugs rather than single drugs, and all the results would remain the same.
7disease. Let vn  0 be the ex-post eectiveness of drug n. We can think of vn as the increase
in future \health" units (measured, for example, in quality-adjusted life years) that the drug
provides to an individual who has developed the disease. Without loss of generality, label
drug N as a maximally valuable drug, i.e. vN = maxn vn. Finally, dene zn = nvn as the
expected benet of drug n.
Consumers' utility is strictly increasing in future \health" or life quality and is quasi-
linear and strictly increasing in money. Consider some consumer a. Consumer a's willingness
to pay for insurance that covers drug n is related to the probability of disease (n) as well
as the drug's ability to increase the quality of her future life-years (vn). Let ua be consumer
a's willingness to pay for insurance coverage of an additional unit of future life quality.10 We
assume that ua is distributed in the population according to some probability distribution
() with cumulative distribution function P(). So, we can write a consumer's willingness
to pay (in dollars) for insurance that covers drug n as uanvn = uazn.11
The population consists of a unit mass of consumers, although all results still hold for a
single consumer or any nite number of consumers.12 We assume that consumers have access
to a market for actuarially fair insurance, which is available \ a la carte" on an individual drug
basis. Thus, thinking about a consumer's willingness to pay for actuarially fair insurance
coverage of a drug is equivalent to thinking about her willingness to pay for that drug.
There are potentially two sources of heterogeneity in willingness to pay for drugs: dier-
ences in health status and dierences in willingness to pay for health. We focus on the latter
by assuming that all consumers have the same probability n of contracting any disease n, or
equivalently that a perfect risk adjustment mechanism is available.13 Assuming perfect risk
10Assuming ua to be constant is a reasonable approximation for small probability events.
11We assume that the per-unit drug prices faced by individual consumers on the open market are equal
to (or not lower than) the per-unit prices faced by insurance companies that sell actuarially fair insurance.
Risk-averse consumers strictly prefer to purchase actuarially fair insurance for drugs. Consequently, if a
consumer chooses not to purchase actuarially fair insurance for a particular drug, then she will choose not
to purchase that drug in the event she does get sick.
12We model consumers as a continuum whose mass is normalized to unity because speaking about the
proportion of consumers with access to a drug is more natural than speaking about the probability that a
consumer has access to a drug.
13Risk adjustment plays an essential role in the design of Medicare Part D and many other insurance
8adjustment focuses attention on an already complicated benchmark for prescription drug
procurement without additional complications due to adverse selection. Furthermore, when
all drugs are supplied by monopolists, it is theoretically possible to construct a perfect risk
adjustment mechanism (see Fong & Schwarz (2009)).
Finally, there is a perfectly competitive market of risk-neutral prescription drug plans
(PDP's), which engage in Bertrand-style competition. PDP's serve as intermediaries between
consumers and drug companies. Each PDP assembles a formulary of drugs to which its
members have access. If a drug is not covered by a consumer's PDP, the consumer has the
option of purchasing the drug, or actuarially fair supplemental insurance for that drug, on
the open market.
Consumers have private information about their willingness to pay for health ua. How-
ever, the distribution () is common knowledge. In addition, the expected benets of each
drug zn = nvn are common knowledge among consumers, drug companies, and PDP's.14
The government, however, does not know the values of each drug.
1.2 A Simple Example
Before presenting the mechanism in detail and proving general results, we rst present a
simple example to illustrate the main ideas.
Consider a world in which there are N = 151 drugs, 100 of which provide value of one to
consumers who have developed the associated disease, i.e. vn = 1, and 51 of which provide
value of two to consumers who have developed the associated disease, i.e. vn = 2. We
have a unit mass of consumers indexed by a, and in this world, we assume that all are
healthy and develop each disease independently with identical probability n = 0:01 for all
n. However, consumers do not have the same willingness to pay for drugs due to dierences
programs.
14The assumption that consumers know the relative values of every drug is not necessary for our results to
hold. Instead it is sucient to assume that consumers are capable of selecting the most valuable formulary
from amongst those oered by PDP's. That assumption would be satised in a world in which trustworthy
entities provide consumers with formulary rankings based on value.
9in preferences and in wealth. In particular, we assume that the marginal willingness to pay
for coverage of an additional unit of future health, ua, is uniformly distributed between 0
and 100. Conditional on consumers being healthy then, the willingness to pay for actuarially
fair insurance coverage of any drug is uniformly distributed between 0 and vn.
Notice that each drug company faces a linear, downward-sloping demand curve. In
the benchmark case of the open market, each drug company acts as a prot-maximizing
monopolist and sets its price at 50vn. As a result, actuarially fair insurance costs 0:5vn per
drug, and half of the population, i.e. those with willingness to pay above 0.5, purchases
insurance and receives drugs if needed. Expected prots to each monopolist are 0:25vn,
and the total amount spent by consumers is (0.25  100) + (0.5  51) = 50.5. In such a
market, half the population is excluded from all drugs. Even if the government subsidizes
the purchase of drugs by covering half their costs, monopolists will double prices in response
and half of the population will continue to be excluded.
Alternatively, consider the following market-based, government-funded drug procurement
mechanism. The government commits to a maximum budget of 50 for procuring drugs for
the whole population. However, the value of each drug is not known to the government.
Hence, it delegates drug procurement and formulary assembly to two private competing
prescription drug plans (PDP's), who know the value of drugs, and gives each PDP a budget
of 50 scaled by market share.
Through a centralized procurement auction, each drug company is asked to specify the
price at which it is willing to sell its drug. PDP's can purchase actuarially fair insurance for
drugs at those prices, and each PDP uses those prices to decide which drugs to cover on its
formulary subject to the budget constraint. Drug companies can choose not to participate in
the auction, and if a drug company opts out, or if its drug is not included on the formulary, the
company has the right to sell its drug on the open market at its monopoly prot-maximizing
price. In the procurement auction, even though the prot-maximizing market price is 50vn,
each company is willing to bid a price as low as 25vn because doing so implies an expected
10prot of 0:25vn, the same prot the company obtains from opting out of the procurement
auction and selling on the open market. Notice, however, that in equilibrium not all drugs
can be fully covered because meeting all drug companies' outside option prots of 0:25vn
exceeds the budget, i.e. (0.25  100) + (0.5  51) > 50.
In equilibrium, all companies must bid at the exact same price-to-value ratio because
otherwise companies bidding at lower ratios can shade upwards and just undercut companies
bidding at higher ratios. As a result, the only equilibrium involves all drug companies bidding
a price of exactly 25vn. Actuarially fair insurance for each drug then costs 0:25vn. Due to
competition for membership, each PDP assembles its formulary to maximize social value {
for example, it is an equilibrium for each PDP to include all of the 100 value-1 drugs as well
as 50 of the value-2 drugs randomly chosen from the 51.15
Under this alternative mechanism, the entire population can have access to all but a
single drug, yielding over 99% eciency, while total spending remains unchanged. Notice
that the approximate eciency result is not a coincidence. We have chosen the budget to
be exactly equal to
PN 1
n=1 rn, which is the maximum budget that satises Proposition 1 in
Section 2.1. In Figure 1, this budget is the highest value for which the mechanism achieves
exactly rst-best.
Even though both the total spending on drugs and the prots to drug companies remain
the same as under the benchmark monopoly regime, the share of the population with access
to almost all drugs doubles. Because drug companies' prots are unchanged, incentives for
innovation remain unchanged as well.
1.3 The Mechanism
We now describe the mechanism in detail. While it is publicly-funded, implementation is
private { private prescription drug plans (PDP's) receive government subsidies but must
compete to attract members.
15Note that any other formulary with the same social value is also an equilibrium.
11The government rst sets a xed per-member subsidy B for PDP's to use in assembling
formularies. Each PDP then assembles a formulary of drugs to which members have access
at marginal cost (which we assume to be zero). PDP's do not have the option of charging a
membership premium. If a member wishes to buy a drug not on her PDP's formulary, she
has the option to purchase the drug (or actuarially fair drug insurance) at market prices.16
Prices are set for all PDP's via a single procurement auction. In the auction each drug
company submits a bid bn, indicating the minimum price the company is willing to accept for
its drug. This creates a vector of bids b = (b1;b2;:::;bN). Given the xed budget constraint
B and the bid vector b, each PDP assembles a formulary. Any unused budget becomes a
PDP's prot. PDP's compete for membership, and since consumers choose PDP's with the
most valuable formulary, each PDP assembles the most valuable formulary possible within
the budget in order to attract members.
A formulary consists of a set of drugs that the PDP covers. To avoid integer constraints,
we allow PDP's to oer partial coverage. Having a partially covered drug on the formulary
means that the drug is covered for a randomly selected fraction, strictly between zero and
one, of the PDP's members. In particular, if the remaining budget is  and the next drug
the PDP wants to cover has bid ^ b > , then the PDP covers that drug for a fraction 
^ b of
members (in equilibrium at most one drug is partially covered).17 To break ties, we assume
that in assembling formularies PDP's have a lexicographic preference for maximizing the
number of fully covered drugs.18
The strategic component of the mechanism lies in the procurement auction { the bids
submitted directly determine formulary compositions of PDPs. Thus, analysis surrounds
equilibrium bidding behavior in the auction.
16Note that instead of PDP's, it would be analytically identical to assume consumers assemble their own
\ a la carte" formularies.
17Partial coverage of drugs is not unheard of. Drug plans routinely cover certain drugs on a case-by-case
basis, although these decisions aren't meant to be random.
18Removing this tie-breaking assumption would have no eect on the expected social value of equilibrium
formularies. Including it allows us to focus on the equilibrium formulary that has the maximum number of
fully covered drugs.
12The auction format we consider is a sealed bid (simultaneous-move) auction. Each drug
company n submits a private bid bn 2 [0;1) to the auctioneer, or chooses not to participate.
Note that drug companies do not learn any information about other bids. One way to view
the sealed bid auction format is as a model of unstructured negotiation where monopolist
drug companies have all the bargaining power.
2 Analysis
In this section, we lay the necessary groundwork and then analyze equilibrium behavior.
The drug procurement mechanism we have described in the previous section is voluntary.
A drug company can choose not to participate and instead to sell its drug on the open market
as a monopolist. We characterize a drug company's participation constraint by dening a
company's reserve fee in the procurement auction: that fee is the minimum \per-person
prot," i.e. ratio of expected total prot to population size, that the company requires in
the auction. Denote drug company n's reserve fee by rn. In Lemma 1, we show that this
reserve fee is proportional to the expected health benet zn of drug n.
We rst consider per-person budgets B that are \suciently large" to satisfy all drug
companies' participation constraints and to achieve full eciency (in theory), i.e. B 
PN
n=1 rn. We show that in this case almost all drugs are available to all consumers (at zero
cost). Later in Section 2.1, we consider the case when the budget is small and show that the
mechanism performs well in that case also.
We claim that under a sealed bid procurement auction, the mechanism achieves near
eciency. The following theorem makes our claim formal.
Theorem 1. Let B 
PN
n=1 rn. In any Nash equilibrium of the sealed bid (simultaneous-
move) procurement auction, the expected social value of the equilibrium formulary is greater
than or equal to a formulary that fully covers N  1 drugs, i.e. a formulary that fully covers
all drugs but one (which may be the drug with the highest reserve fee).
13Before proceeding to the proof, we introduce some preliminary notation and results. Let
bid bn denote the price for which drug company n indicates it is willing to sell one unit of
its drug. Notice that bn implies that in expectation, the per-person price of covering drug n
is nbn. To make a non-negative prot, a PDP must choose a formulary where the sum of
per-person prices of all drugs on the formulary does not exceed the budget B.
It is convenient to consider normalized bids, dened for drug company n as en = nbn
rn . A
normalized bid is equal to the expected per-person price of drug n, scaled by the reserve fee
rn, which is proportional to drug n's expected health benet. Focusing on normalized bids
is more convenient analytically, as doing so places drug companies' bids on the same \scale"
of expected per-person price per unit of expected benet. Normalized bids are particularly
useful because, given that PDP's assemble formularies to maximize total expected benet,
a PDP will never include a drug with some normalized bid without also including all drugs
with lower normalized bids. Notice that to satisfy a company's participation constraint, the
normalized bid must be at least 1, i.e. nbn  rn.
We now explicitly characterize a drug company's reserve fee, i.e. rn. Recall that if a
drug company does not participate in the auction, it sells its drug on the open market as a
monopolist instead. Because our model considers only drugs without substitutes, the prot
the drug company receives from not participating in the government mechanism is exactly
equal to the monopoly prots the company would receive in the absence of any government
intervention. We can show that a company's total monopoly prot is in fact linear in its
drug's average expected benet, i.e. zn = nvn, and hence each company's reserve fee rn is
linear in zn.19 Formally, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. There exists a constant K > 0 such that rn = Kzn for all n 2 f0;1;:::;Ng.
Proof. This proof follows Schwarz (2006). Denote the prot-maximizing monopoly price
19Since all PDP's are identical and consider the same bids from drug companies, in equilibrium all formu-
laries will be the same. If a drug is covered on any formulary, it will be covered on all formularies and hence
be available to the entire population. Thus, to match its outside option, a drug company need only submit
a bid that is equal to its outside option prots (i.e. open market monopoly prots) divided by the entire
population.
14by  . Recall that a market for actuarially fair insurance exists and that a consumer is
willing to pay uanvn for insurance coverage of drug n. When the price of drug n is set
at  n, the demand for insurance coverage for drug n is equal to the mass of consumers for
whom uanvn exceeds n n, i.e. uavn   n. We can write (expected) conditional demand as
D( n) = n
R 1
 n=vn dP(ua). That represents the fraction of consumers who are willing to buy









Notice that demand depends only on the ratio between price  n and eectiveness vn. There-
fore each drug company maximizes its expected prots by serving the same proportion of
the population, i.e. choosing the same ratio of price  n to eectiveness vn. As a result,
a drug company's total monopoly prot is linear in its drug's average expected benet zn.
Therefore, for any n, the company's reserve fee rn is also linear in zn.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on three additional lemmas.
Lemma 2. If drug company n submits a normalized bid of e = B PN
i=1 ri, then in any equilib-
rium drug n will be fully covered. As a result, submitting a normalized bid of en < e is a
strictly dominated strategy for any company n.
Proof. If all drug companies submit a normalized bid of e, then full coverage of all drugs will
just t within the budget. Hence, a normalized bid of e guarantees drug n is fully covered
on the formulary, and bidding any lower leads only to a strictly lower payo. (Note that
bidding e satises drug company n's participation constraint since B 
PN
i=1 ri.)
Lemma 3. There exists a constant  > 0 such that for any equilibrium bid for any drug, the
probability of that drug being at least partially covered is greater than or equal to .
15Proof. Recall from Lemma 2 that ern is a lower bound on the expected payo to drug
company n. We now determine an upper bound on that payo.
If drug n is partially or fully covered, a strict upper bound on its maximum payo is
B + rn, since B is the maximum payo drug n receives from its covered portion and rn is
a strict upper bound on the maximum payo drug n receives from its uncovered portion.
On the other hand, if drug n is not covered, the maximum payo is rn. Thus, if  is the
probability of being at least partially covered, a strict upper bound on drug company n's
payo is (B + rn) + (1   )rn = B + rn.
Hence  must be large enough that, for all n, B + rn > ern, i.e.  > (e   1)rn
B  0.
Before stating the next lemma, we need to introduce two denitions. First, for a given
vector of bids, dene d as the sum of reserve fees of all fully uncovered drugs plus the reserve
fees of all partially covered drugs multiplied by the uncovered share of those drugs. In other
words, d measures the total prots earned by drug companies on the open market (not
covered by the formulary). One consequence then is that the sum of all drug companies'
prots combined is equal to B + d.
Secondly, since d is a random variable in any mixed strategy equilibrium, dene  d as the
expected value of d.
Lemma 4. If  d is greater than the monopoly prot of the most valuable drug, i.e.  d > rN,
then in any equilibrium, for any equilibrium realization of bids, there is at least one drug
that has zero coverage and there are at least two drugs that are not fully covered (but may be
partially covered).
Proof. First, we remark that with probability one there is at most one partially covered drug
in equilibrium. Consider any two drugs with a positive probability of not being fully covered.
The probability of both drugs having the same normalized bid is an event of measure zero
because otherwise any of the bidders could strictly increase its payo by lowering its bid by
an arbitrarily small amount in this event. Thus, without loss of generality we assume that
16there is at most one partially covered drug in any equilibrium formulary realization.
Suppose there exists an equilibrium realization of bids such that all drugs are covered at
least partially and therefore at least N   1 drugs are fully covered. Since any drug that is
fully covered under a particular realization of bids receives a prot that is greater than or
equal to the expected prot that the drug receives in equilibrium, it follows that B+rN must
be greater than or equal to the total expected prot of the drug companies, which is equal
to B +  d. Hence, it follows that  d  rN, which contradicts the assumption of the lemma.
Proof. (Theorem 1) We prove Theorem 1 by showing that  d must be smaller than the
reserve fee of the most valuable drug. We begin by assuming the contrary and then arrive
at a contradiction.
Suppose that  d is greater than the reserve fee (i.e. monopoly prot) of the most valuable
drug. Lemma 4 then tells us that under any equilibrium realization of bids at least one
drug has zero coverage and at least two drugs are not fully covered. But as long as there is
always one fully uncovered drug for any equilibrium vector of bids, we show below that there
must exist an equilibrium action that leads to a drug not being covered with arbitrarily high
probability, hence contradicting Lemma 3.
Consider the range of normalized bids that are consistent with an equilibrium (a mixed
strategy involves a drug company randomizing over a range of normalized bids). Denote
the supremum of that range for drug company n as emax
n . If the set is unbounded, let
emax
n = 1. Also, let emax = maxn emax
n so that emax is the highest normalized bid encountered
in equilibrium.
Now consider some drug company i for whom emax
i = emax. As company i's bid approaches
emax, the probability that drug i will have zero coverage approaches one. However, this
violates Lemma 3. Hence, we have a contradiction and therefore conclude that  d must be
less than the reserve fee of the most valuable drug.
172.1 Small Budgets
We have shown that suciently large budgets yield near ecient outcomes. We now show
that when the budget is small, the mechanism performs very well.
We begin by dening a \rst-best" benchmark for comparison. Recall that in our model
we consider a world in which the government does not know the values of each drug. Let us
now consider a counterfactual world in which the government knows exactly the values of
each drug (and hence the monopoly prots each drug would generate on the open market).
Moreover, the government has the power to make lump-sum take-it-or-leave-it oers to drug
companies in exchange for any of its citizens being able to consume a company's drug when
needed. In this benchmark world, the government assembles the most valuable formulary
subject to two constraints: (1) the cost per person does not exceed the budget B, and (2)
each drug company receives exactly its monopoly prots (thus ensuring that participation
is voluntary and there are no distortions to innovation). We will refer to the value of that
formulary as rst-best.
In our model, because the government is not informed about the values of each drug,
rst-best may not be achievable. For small budgets, however, Proposition 1 shows that in
fact the rst-best formulary value is achievable.
Proposition 1. Let B 
PN 1
n=1 rn. In the unique equilibrium of the sealed bid procurement
auction, the expected social value of the equilibrium formulary is exactly equal to rst-best,
i.e. the maximum formulary value achieved in the benchmark world in which the government
knows exactly the values of each drug and has the power to make lump-sum take-it-or-leave-it
oers to drug companies.
For small budgets, the mechanism we have described leads to a formulary in which all on-
formulary drugs are covered at exactly a normalized bid of one. By paying for on-formulary
drugs an amount that is equal to the prots that would have been generated under monopoly
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Figure 1: Illustration of formulary value achieved by mechanism, as a function of budget B
not just the fraction that can aord those drugs at monopoly prices.
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward. If the budget is not large enough to meet
all drug companies' reserve fees, then competition to get on the formulary will drive each
company to bid down to a level that generates expected prots equal to its reserve fee
of monopoly prots. No drug company can get on the formulary with a normalized bid
higher than one because it will be undercut by some other drug company. Meanwhile, no
company will submit a normalized bid less than one because its participation constraint will
be violated.
Figure 1 presents an illustration, under both \small" budgets (Proposition 1) and \large"
budgets (Theorem 1), of the formulary value achieved by the mechanism relative to rst-
best. Notice that when the budget is small, those two values are identical { the formulary
value attained by the mechanism is equal to the rst-best. When the budget is large, the
formulary value attained by the mechanism falls below the rst-best, but only by an amount
less than or equal to the value of a single drug.
192.2 Incentives for Innovation
Determining what level of prots correspond to \optimal" incentives for innovation is outside
the scope of this paper, and we remain agnostic about what prot levels are optimal { that
is the topic of a separate, well-developed literature.20
We can show, however, that the mechanism performs well at preserving relative incentives
for innovation across drugs. When the budget is small, i.e. B <
PN 1
n=1 rn, then from Section
2.1 above we know that incentives for innovation are exactly unchanged { all drug companies
receive exactly their monopoly prots.
Now consider the case of large budgets B 
PN
n=1 rn. We can show that total prots
are distributed across all drug companies in close proportion to expected benet. Fix any
equilibrium and let eavg
n denote the expected normalized prot to drug company n. We know
from Lemma 2 that eavg
n > e, where e = B PN
n=1 rn is a lower bound on the normalized prot any
drug company can receive. To understand the distribution of prots across drug companies,
we are interested in how much drug companies' expected prots deviate from that lower




n rn   ern)2
B +  d
;
where the numerator, i.e. the square root of the sum of squared residuals between drug
companies' expected prots and the lower bound, is normalized by total prots across all
drug companies.
As a corollary of Theorem 1, we show that this ratio goes to zero as the value of the largest
drug becomes small relative to the sum of the values of all drugs. To do so, we consider
the worst-case scenario. The numerator takes its maximum value when all drug companies
have expected normalized prots of exactly en = e except for one company, which receives
all remaining prots. Thus, in the worst-case the total deviation of expected prots divided
20For example, see Boldrin and Levine (2006), Garber,ones and Romer (2006), Hopenhayn, Llobet and
Mitchell (2006), and Scotchmer (1999).
20by total prots, i.e. the ratio above, is exactly
rN
B+ d, which is less than or equal to
rN PN
n=1 rn.
Thus, as the value of the largest drug becomes small relative to the sum of the values of
all drugs, the total deviation of expected prots among drugs from the lower bound goes to
zero.
Hence, the mechanism described in the above section continues to do well at preserving
relative incentives for innovation even when the budget is large. In fact, Proposition 2 in
the next section shows that under an ascending clock auction format, relative incentives for
innovation across drugs are perfectly preserved even when budgets are large. Notice that
the budget size B serves as a convenient tool for calibrating the strength of incentives for
innovation in prescription drug markets.
2.3 Extension
The previous section assumes that PDP's are risk neutral players. The mechanism described
in the above section could easily be modied so that we can get the same eciency results
even if PDP's were risk averse and unable to diversify the risk. In particular, the modication
would involve changing the bid format to per-person prices.
Thus far the bid format we have been considering is a conventional linear price: the bid
species the price that drug companies charge to PDP's per unit of the drug. An alternative
bid format is a per-person price: the bid species the price that drug companies charge to
PDP's per consumer covered by the PDP regardless of whether that consumer will need the
drug. Collecting a per-person price for a consumer obligates the drug company to provide
the drug for free in the event the disease is contracted. Note that the results of the previous
section continue to hold if bids are submitted as per-person prices rather than linear prices.
Per-person pricing improves risk-sharing. Linear prices create uncertainty about how
much PDP's will have to pay to drug companies and hence create articial risk for both
PDP's and drug companies, which produce drugs at zero marginal cost. Under per-person
21pricing, that uncertainty disappears.21
We also point out that, in the mechanism described in the previous section, generically
all equilibria are in mixed strategies (see Appendix A.1). The fact that no pure strategy
equilibrium exists may be seen as an undesirable property. However, mixed strategy equi-
libria arise due to the simultaneous-move nature of the mechanism; in mechanisms where
players move sequentially, pure strategy equilibria can be attained.
In this section, we consider auctions in which drug companies bid in terms of per-person
prices rather than linear prices, so PDP's need not be risk neutral. To avoid ties, we assume
that for all i 6= j, vi 6= vj. We consider two sequential-move auctions: the ascending clock
auction and the descending clock auction. We prove that each auction features a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies that achieves near eciency.
Fix some pmax 2 [B;1). The rules of the auctions are as follows:22
 Ascending Clock Auction. The clock begins at per-person price p = 0 and increases
continuously until p = pmax. Each drug company n chooses a level at which to leave
the auction, and that becomes its per-person bid pn. There is no re-entry permitted.
Upon observing a dropout at p, a bidder can drop out only at a level strictly higher
than p. Ties are broken in favor of later bidders.
 Descending Clock Auction. The clock begins at per-person price p = pmax and decreases
continuously until p = 0. Each drug company n chooses a level at which to leave the
auction, and that becomes its per-person bid pn. There is no re-entry permitted. Upon
observing a dropout at p, a bidder can drop out only at a level strictly lower than p.
Ties are broken in favor of later bidders.
The following propositions show that, like the sealed bid auction, both clock auctions
21Admittedly, in reality the risks generated by linear drug pricing are easily diversiable. Nonetheless, it is
theoretically interesting that such risks can be avoided using per-person pricing. For the auctions considered
in this section, per-person pricing makes the analytical treatment simpler and more transparent.
22For completeness, we include non-participation as a viable action in both auctions (although it is not
important for equilibrium analysis). So the action space for bidders in each auction consists of either
submitting a per-person bid p 2 [0;pmax] in the auction or not participating at all.
22lead to near ecient outcomes. Unlike the sealed bid auction, however, those outcomes are
achieved in unique, pure-strategy equilibria. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 2. (Ascending Clock Auction) Let B 
PN
n=1 rn. The unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the ascending clock auction is a pure strategy equilibrium in which all
drugs are fully covered on the formulary except for the most valuable drug, which is partially
covered. Moreover, the total prot of each drug company n is in constant proportion to its
drug's expected health benet zn.
In the ascending clock auction, the most valuable drug, or the drug with the highest expected
benet zn, is only partially covered on the formulary. The intuition is that in the ascending
clock auction, the last bidder to bid, i.e. the company with the most valuable drug, can bid
arbitrarily high (up to the maximum bid pmax) so that it collects not only the excess budget
but also some monopoly prots from the open market since its drug is only partially covered.
Other bidders cannot act to lower the payos of this highest-value drug company, because
it has the last-mover advantage { it can always threaten to undercut previous bidders and
get its drug fully covered on the formulary.
Proposition 3. (Descending Clock Auction) Let B 
PN
n=1 rn. The unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the descending clock auction is a pure strategy equilibrium in which all
drugs are fully covered on the formulary except for one drug, which is partially covered. The
partially covered drug is not the most valuable drug.
The intuition is similar to the ascending clock auction. The main dierences are that it is
(a) not the highest-value drug that is left partially covered and (b) not necessarily the last
company to bid that is left partially covered. Instead, the identity of the drug company that
remains partially covered depends on the distribution of drugs' values. What drives these
dierences is that in the descending clock auction, a given bidder's maximum bid is bounded
from above because bidders with lower-value drugs bid later. So no company can submit a
higher bid than what a company with a higher value drug has already submitted.
23Although both clock-auctions achieve near-eciency, covering all drugs but at most one,
we show in Appendix A.3 that the descending clock auction generally leads to a formulary
with higher social value than the ascending clock auction.
3 Concluding Remarks
There are several intuitive approaches for increasing access to prescription drugs using
government-funded market-driven mechanisms. One approach is for the government to use
market prices as benchmarks for the prices it pays, as in the case of Medicaid. Another
approach is for the government to directly subsidize health insurance by making its purchase
tax-deductible, as in the case of employer-provided health insurance. Research has shown,
however, that both those approaches may have the unintended eect of raising drug prices
and thus reducing rather than increasing the number of people with access to prescription
drugs (Morton (1997), Schwarz (2006), Duggan & Morton (2006)).
Yet a third approach, which we study in this paper, is to make monopolists \compete"
for scarce portions of a xed subsidy, as in the case of Medicare Part D.23;24 We show that
at least in theory this third approach may lead very close to universal access: we describe
a market-driven mechanism with xed government subsidies in which all consumers have
access to all but at most one drug.
The structure of the mechanism we describe is similar in many ways to the current form
of Medicare Part D. Medicare's drug benet is a government-funded, market-driven federal
entitlement program in which private prescription drug plans receive xed per-member sub-
sidies from the government but must compete through assembling formularies and setting
premiums to attract members.
There are several major points of distinction. First, our eciency results hinge on creating
23For details on the design of Medicare Part D, see McAdams & Schwarz (2007).
24Notice that this logic has interesting antitrust implications. Because non-substitue drugs compete with
one another based on cost eectiveness, a merger between two drug companies can put upward pressure on
prices paid by Medicare even if no two drugs, one from each company's portfolio, are substitutes.
24competition between monopolists for coverage by PDP's. Hence, it is crucial that every drug
face the threat of being left o the formulary. The design of Medicare Part D, however,
removes that threat for various drugs. By law the government requires coverage of \all or
substantially all" drugs within various \protected" classes of drugs and has created a pathway
for identifying and protecting additional medications (see the Medicare Improvements for
Patients and Providers Act, 2008).
Moreover, the mechanism we describe depends critically upon consumers choosing PDP's
based on formulary comprehensiveness. PDP's then assemble formularies to maximize ex-
pected health benet. In contrast, the current implementation of Part D makes it dicult
for beneciaries to compare comprehensiveness. To assist seniors in choosing the right drug
plans, the government-run online Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder ranks plans based
only on information about drugs that beneciaries are currently taking (or know they are
likely to take). The government provides no information about formulary comprehensive-
ness.25
The mechanism we describe highlights the importance of formulary comprehensiveness
in determining eciency, suggesting a novel way to measure a drug's market penetration.
The current measure predominantly used by the pharmaceutical industry is the percentage
of people diagnosed with the relevant condition who take that drug. Our analysis suggests
another meaningful measure of market penetration, namely formulary penetration: the per-
centage of formularies that include that drug, which thus reects the percentage of people
who have access to that drug.
The analysis in this paper applies principles of economic theory to prescription drug mar-
kets using a highly stylized model. As we have emphasized, this paper is intended primarily
as a thought exercise rather than a blueprint for market design. Our main objective is to
oer a conceptual framework for ecient design of government-funded drug procurement.
25Even obtaining the list of drugs covered by a particular PDP is dicult.
25A Appendix
A.1 No Generic Pure Strategy Equilibrium under Sealed Bid Auc-
tion
Lemma 5. A pure strategy equilibrium in the sealed-bid auction does not generically exist.
Proof. Suppose there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which each drug company submits
a bid of bn. One potential outcome is that all drugs are fully covered on the formulary. In
this case, any drug company can protably deviate by changing its bid to bmax( B) so that
its drug becomes partially covered and collects not only a portion of the budget B but also
a portion of monopoly prots on the open market. So there is no pure strategy equilibrium
in this case.
The other potential outcome is that some drugs are fully covered on the formulary, and
some drugs are not. That implies that some drug companies are submitting normalized
bids strictly greater than 1 and getting on the formulary. Hence, any drug company whose
drug is not fully covered on the formulary can protably deviate by changing its bid to just
undercut the normalized bid of an on-formulary drug and thus become fully covered on the
formulary at a normalized bid level greater than 1.
Hence, no generic pure strategy equilibrium exists.
A.2 Proofs of Proposition 2 and 3
In the following proofs, we label bidders in the order that they bid. So the rst bidder to
bid is bidder 1, the second bidder to bid is bidder 2, and so on so that the last bidder to bid
is bidder N. In the ascending clock auction, bidder N will turn out to be the highest value
bidder (i.e. the bidder with the most valuable drug); meanwhile in the descending clock
auction, bidder N will turn out to be the lowest value bidder (i.e. the bidder with the least
valuable drug).
26When we refer to bidders in terms of their drugs' values, we use parentheses. For example,
the reserve value for the most valuable drug is r(1) and the reserve value for the least valuable
drug is r(N).
Recall that we have set up our model so that there are no ties. First, ri 6= rj for all i 6= j
so that no two bidders have both the same bid and the same normalized bid. Secondly, in
the rules of the sequential-move auction formats, we have indicated that ties are broken in
favor of later bidders { so if two drug companies submit bids at the same normalized level,
the later bidder has priority for inclusion on the formulary.
Lemma 6. In a clock auction (ascending or descending) with B 
PN
n=1 r(n), there does not
exist an equilibrium in which all bidders bid e = 1.
Proof. Suppose all bidders are bidding e = 1. Consider the last bidder to bid. This bidder
has incentive to deviate and bid as high as possible, which allows it to collect both the
excess budget and a positive fraction of monopoly prots. Notice that if a bidder bids at a
normalized level higher than e = 1 and receives any of the budget, then that bidder receives
a total payo strictly higher than monopoly prots (i.e. the bidder's reserve fee).
To be more specic, in the ascending clock auction the last bidder can deviate to bmax and
take excess budget B  
PN 1
n=1 rn =  ( rN) in addition to a positive fraction (1   
bmax ) of
monopoly prots. Similarly, in the descending clock auction the last bidder can deviate to the
second last bidder's bid and take excess budget B 
PN 1
n=1 rn ( rN), in addition to a positive
fraction of monopoly prots. Thus all bidders bidding e = 1 is not an equilibrium.
Lemma 7. In a clock auction (ascending or descending) with B 
PN
n=1 r(n), there does not
exist an equilibrium in which some bidder receives none of the budget.
Proof. Since B 
PN
n=1 r(n), there always exist a small enough  > 0 such that if drug
company i bids  above its reserve fee ri, then in any equilibrium drug i will at least be
partially covered on the formulary. In the worst case, all other drug companies bid at
normalized levels slightly lower than that of drug company i and excess budget B 
P
n6=i rn 
270 > 0 remains for drug company i to receive at least partial coverage. Since any drug
company i always has the option of bidding arbitrarily close to its reserve fee in order to
gain partial coverage and receive a payo strictly higher than its reserve fee, there does not
exist an equilibrium in which some drug company receives none of the budget.
Lemma 8. In any equilibrium of a clock auction (ascending or descending) with B 
PN
n=1 r(n), exactly one bidder gets less than full coverage.
Proof. First we show that at most one bidder gets less than full coverage. Suppose there is
an equilibrium in which at least two bidders are less than fully covered. Lemma 7 tells us
that these bidders must be receiving some of the budget and hence they must be partially
covered. However, at most one bidder can be partially covered since there are no ties.
Now we show that at least one bidder gets less than full coverage. Suppose there is an
equilibrium in which all bidders are fully covered. To be an equilibrium, the entire budget
must be depleted. The last bidder can achieve a higher payo by deviating and increasing
its bid, thereby becoming partially covered, collecting the remaining portion of the budget
and receiving extra payo from the open market.
Lemma 9. The unique equilibrium of the ascending clock auction involves all bidders bidding
at the same normalized level e except for the bidder with the highest value drug, who bids
bmax. That last bidder is partially covered on the formulary while all the other bidders are
fully covered. All bidders receive normalized prots of e.
Proof. First, we characterize the normalized bid e  1 such that if the rst N  1 bidders all
bid at normalized level e, then the optimal bid for bidder N is to bid bmax and be partially
covered on the formulary. The only other bid worth considering is for bidder N to bid e and
be fully covered. Bidding bmax is preferred so long as























Recall that rN = r(1). Notice that e is the (maximum) value of e that exactly satises the
above inequality. If the rst N   1 bidders all bid at e or lower, then the optimal bid for
bidder N is indeed to bid bmax, which leads to expected normalized prots of e.
Now consider the rst N   1 bidders. A key observation is the following: the maximal
payo a bidder j 2 f1;2;:::;N   1g can hope to receive from bidding e > e and being









That payo is never higher than the payo from being fully covered on the formulary at e:
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Plugging in (A.1) for e, we get
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which is always true since the LHS numerator is larger than the RHS numerator, while the
LHS denominator is smaller than the RHS denominator. Equality holds if and only if j = N.
Therefore, if any bidder j 2 f1;2;:::;N   1g has the opportunity to be fully covered at a
normalized bid of  e  e, then bidding  e is always preferred to bidding at some e >  e and
being partially covered.
We now use backwards induction to prove that it is a subgame perfect equilibrium for
each bidder j 2 f1;2;:::;N   1g to bid exactly e. Consider bidder N   1, the second last
bidder to bid. Suppose that all previous bidders have bid e. If bidder N   1 bids e, then
bidder N will bid bmax and hence bidder N   1 will be fully covered on the formulary at e.
On the other hand, if bidder N   1 bids anything higher than e, then bidder N will match
29that bid and bidder N   1 will be partially covered. Hence, bidder N   1 prefers to bid e
and be fully covered. Suppose instead that some previous bidder has bid e > e. Then both
bidder N   1 and bidder N will choose to match e and be fully covered on the formulary
(leaving the previous bidder that has bid e > e to be partially covered).
Now, consider bidder N   2. An identical argument holds. Suppose that all previous
bidders have bid e. If bidder N   2 bids e, then we know from above that bidder N   2
will be fully covered on the formulary. On the other hand, if bidder N  2 bids e > e, then
bidder N   2 will be partially covered. Hence, bidder N   2 prefers to bid e and be fully
covered. Suppose instead that some previous bidder has bid e > e. Then bidder N   2
prefers to match e and be fully covered.
Continuing the backwards induction for all bidders j = N  3;N  4;:::;1, we nd that
bidder 1 prefers to bid e and be fully covered rather than bid some e > e and be partially
covered. Hence, we conclude that it is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for all bidders
1;2;:::;N   1 to bid e and for bidder N to bid bmax.
Lemma 10. The unique equilibrium of the descending clock auction involves all bidders but
one being fully covered and one bidder being partially covered.
Proof. From Lemma 8 we know that in any pure strategy equilibrium, exactly one bidder
gets less than full coverage. Our rst step is to show that this bidder cannot be completely
uncovered. One way a bidder can receive no coverage is by bidding bmax( B). In the
descending clock auction, no bidder bids bmax in equilibrium because doing so requires that
bidder to move rst and eectively eliminate itself from the auction completely. The only
other way in which some bidder j can get no coverage is if it bids at a nite level and all
the other drugs bid such that the budget is exactly depleted and bidder j has the highest
normalized bid. But in this case, since B 
PN
n=1 r(n), bidder j has a protable deviation to
a lower normalized bid near 1 that guarantees a spot on the formulary. Hence in any pure
strategy equilibrium, exactly one bidder gets partial coverage.
30Our second step is to show that in any equilibrium, a later bidder never bids at a normal-
ized level below that of an earlier bidder. This is obvious if the earlier bidder is fully covered
on the formulary in equilibrium since then the later bidder can match that bid and therefore
be fully covered on the formulary as well. If instead the earlier bidder is not fully covered
on the formulary in equilibrium (and hence is the only bidder not fully covered), then it is
optimal for the later bidder to match the earlier bidder and hence obtain full coverage on
the formulary.
Our third step is to prove that any equilibrium takes the following form: for some j 2
f2;:::;Ng, (a) bidders 1 through j   1 bid at some normalized level e1  1 and are fully
covered, (b) bidder j bids at some higher normalized level e2 > e1 and is partially covered,
and (c) all remaining bidders j+1 through N bid at normalized level e2 and are fully covered.
To prove that, we show that in any equilibrium, for any two bidders k and k + 1, if both
bidders are fully covered on the formulary, then both bidders must be bidding at the same
normalized level. Suppose not and that bidder k is bidding at a lower normalized level than
bidder k + 1. Then we claim that bidder k has a protable upward deviation, at least by
, that keeps bidder k still fully covered on the formulary. The only concern when bidder k
deviates upward is if bidder k +1 now revises its bid downward to undercut bidder k. Even
if bidder k + 1 does so, however, we know there is some other bidder j that, in the original
equilibrium, is partially covered and bidding higher than what bidder k + 1 was originally
bidding. That bidder j will still prefer to be partially covered because (a) either j < k so
bidder j has already bid and the conclusion is trivial, or (b) j > k + 1 and bidder j faces a
larger excess budget than before.
Our nal step is to show that there exists an equilibrium and it is unique. That is, there
exists an equilibrium of the form described above with a unique identity of bidder j that is
partially covered and unique normalized bids e1 and e2.
Suppose bidder 1 has chosen some normalized bid e1. We assume e1 is appropriate in the
sense that it leads to subgame behavior that resembles the form of the equilibrium described
31above. In particular, e1 is not too high, so that bidder 1 will be on the formulary26; and e1 is
not too low, so that any bidder j > 1 bidding optimally at a normalized level higher than e1
will always be matched by all remaining bidders that follow bidder j.27 Instead, e1 satises
the constraint that at least one later bidder will have incentive to bid at a normalized level
higher than e1, and that later bidder will be the one that is partially covered. By continuity,
we know such an e1 must exist.
The identity j of the partially covered bidder is uniquely determined in the subgame as
the rst bidder willing to bid at some e2 > e1. By our constraints on e1, this then leads
to all remaining bidders bidding e2 and being fully covered. We know that such a bidder j
must exist because in the extreme, if bidders 1 through N  1 bid at the same level (and are
all on getting on the formulary), then bidder N will prefer to bid some e2 > e1 and take the
remaining budget in addition to partial coverage.
Conditional on e1, bidder j chooses its normalized bid e2 > e1 as follows. Let Bj =
B   e1
Pj 1
n=1 rn   e2
PN
n=j+1 rn. Then bidder j chooses e2 to solve
max
e2e1




subject to the following three constraints:
1. All remaining bidders prefer to bid e2 (so that bidder j ends up being partially covered).




3. Bidding at e2 > e1 must lead to a higher payo for bidder j than bidding at e1 and
26The minimum constraint is that there exists some j such that e1 < B P
n6=j rn.
27If e1 is too low, then it can happen that some bidder j > 1 bids higher than e1 and some even later
bidder k > j bids even higher than bidder j. Clearly, this is suboptimal for bidder 1.
32getting fully covered on the formulary:




Since e2 can be arbitrarily close to e1 and B is suciently large, we know that given e1, a
solution e2 exists and, by monotonicity, is unique.
Finally, we show that bidder 1's choice of e1 is unique. This follows immediately from
bidder 1's payo e1r1 being strictly increasing in e1 because bidder 1 simply chooses the
highest e1 possible, subject to the constraints detailed above. That unique e1 makes bidder
j just indierent between bidding e1 (full coverage) and bidding e2 (partial coverage).
A.3 Comparison between Ascending and Descending Clock Auc-
tions
Lemma 11. As bmax increases, the social value of the formulary obtained in the unique
equilibrium of the ascending clock auction converges towards
PN
n=1 zn maxn zn. Meanwhile,
as bmax increases, the social value of the formulary obtained in the unique equilibrium of the
descending clock auction remains unchanged and is strictly greater than
PN
n=1 zn  maxn zn.
Therefore, for any set of drug values fzngn, there exists a b such that if bmax  b, then
the formulary obtained in the unique equilibrium of the descending clock auction has a social
value strictly greater than that of the ascending clock auction.
Proof. In the unique equilibrium of the ascending clock auction, we know that all drugs are
fully covered on the formulary except the highest value drug, which is the last to bid. From
the proof of Lemma 9, we know that the highest value drug always bids bmax and has a
fraction x covered on the formulary, where the numerator of x equals the remaining budget
(which does not increase nearly as fast as bmax) and the denominator equals bmax. Hence, as
33bmax increases, the fraction x converges to 0 and the social value of the formulary converges
towards
PN
n=1 zn   maxn zn.
In the unique equilibrium of the descending clock auction, we know that all drugs are
fully covered on the formulary except for one drug, which is partially covered and which is
not the highest value drug. From the proof of Lemma 10, we know that the equilibrium does
not depend on bmax and hence as bmax increases, the social value of the formulary does not
change.
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